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INTRODUCTION: JUSTICE UNFIXED 
Justice, arguably, is a relational concept. This is inherent in the early defini-
tions of justice that link the term to the virtue of individuals. More precisely, 
Aristotle refers to justice in a general sense as the most perfect virtue because it 
is displayed towards others (pros heteron).1 The famous formula suum cuique 
tribuere also requires a relational understanding.2 This concept is composed of 
variables that are in need of determination if a specific conception of justice is 
to result; it leaves open the object of assignment and, at the same time, it pre-
supposes already existing standards about what is due. This openness is not a 
deficiency of the formula but, instead, a call for reflexivity, which aims at justify-
ing the relevant standards of appropriateness. At least since the natural rights 
theories in modern times, the matter of justice has been focused on the configu-
ration of rights and duties and therefore on relations vis-à-vis others. Whereas 
the operational dimension of justice is about the compliance of actions with giv-
en legal norms that configure rights and duties—administered by courts that are 
supposed to treat like cases alike—the second reflexive dimension is about the 
justification for these norms from an impartial point of view. 
In the past, both dimensions of justice were mainly linked to the state as a 
result of methodological individualism and legal statism. Although claims of jus-
tice are usually viewed as primarily addressed to individuals and their actions, 
the state comes to the fore when—in the operational dimension—moral reason-
ing itself requires an effective legal system for the exact administration of jus-
tice. Regarding the reflexive dimension of justice, the focus on the state is main-
ly due to the idea of democratic law. An impartial justification of legal norms is 
thus supposed to be achieved through that procedural universality that is char-
acteristic of democratic legislation and that makes possible the equal considera-
tion of all interests involved.3 
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 1.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1129b–1130a (T.E. Page et al. eds., H. Rackham 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 2.  See PLATO, POLITEIA, 332b-332c. (P. Shorey trans., Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1969). For the 
Latin expression, see CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, Liber I, § 5, 15 (G.P. Goold, ed., Walter Miller trans., Har-
vard Univ. Press 1975) (c. 44 B.C.E.); see also Ulpianus Dig. 1.1.10 (Th. Mommsen ed., Weidmann Ver-
lag 1870). 
 3.  See Jürgen Habermas, Law and Morality, Lecture at Harvard University, Oct. 1–2, 1986, in 
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 219, 275 (S. McMurrin ed., 1988) (Habermas explains 
that, for Kant, the test for the lawfulness of any legal norm is the criterion whether a law could have 
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This double fixation of the relational character of justice—its reference to 
individual action as well as confining its reflexive dimension to state law—
becomes inadequate where the normative environment of people cannot be as-
sessed solely in terms of individual rationality but must be viewed as constituted 
by the imperatives of emergent communicative systems following a special func-
tional logic. The inadequacy of this dual focus is also apparent where regulation 
of social relations in important fields moves from the state to private actors. 
One might expect that these developments resonate especially in the do-
main of contract law. This is due to the fact that contract is the main legal form 
by which individuals configure the rights and duties that are to apply to their in-
teraction with each other. Contracts may therefore function both as an entry 
point for emergent rationalities to influence the normative configuration set out 
by the parties and as a transmission device to make specific private orders nor-
matively binding throughout society. In either way, social normativities com-
pete with state law to assert normative control in and over bilateral relations. 
From a factual perspective, this means that the law must come to grips with 
phenomena of social regulation without assuming a center of normative hierar-
chy that would be able to integrate the different social demands involved. Re-
garding the requirements for justification of legal norms, this implies that pro-
cedural universality as promised by national legislation cannot operate as the 
touchstone for impartiality any more. As it seems, legal analysis needs to reflect 
on the public dimension of contract especially where the assumption of repre-
senting public interest through the state cannot be maintained. Here, the law is 
in need of new modes of justification. 
II 
CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF NORMATIVE WORLDS 
A.  Radical Normative Pluralism in (Contract) Law 
A good starting point for legal analysis, given circumstances of normative 
pluralism, is a constructivist theory of observation. Unlike legal theories that 
are based on premises of cognitive idealism, a constructivist approach does not 
presume a common world shared by an analog structure of cognition present in 
individuals. Instead, it contends that all observation is dependent on distinctions 
being made in the medium of meaning, and that recognition of the environ-
ment, within a certain context of communications that process meaning, there-
fore is dependent on the distinctions applied in observation.4 
The use of a specific cognitive model is of major relevance to legal analysis. 
As Robert Cover explained, no set of legal institutions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning.5 He emphasized that normative 
 
arisen from the united will of an entire people).   
 4.  See Hugo Fjelsted Alrøe, Science as Systems Learning: Some Reflections on the Cognitive and 
Communicational Aspects of Science 7 CYBERNETICS & HUMAN KNOWING 57, 67 (2000). 
 5.  See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1983). 
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rules are placed in a rich contextuality that must be opened up in order to un-
derstand the law itself.6 This is due to the fact that interpretive commitments de-
termine what law means and what law is to be.7 The creation of legal meaning 
(“jurisgenesis”) takes place through an essentially cultural process in which the 
normative register of society becomes related to the various constructions of re-
ality.8 Although Cover assumes that these interpretive commitments are always 
the commitments of a community of people, his insights are suited for abstrac-
tion.9 Not just collectives with a certain historical identity are engaged in the id-
iosyncratic creation of meaning. According to systems theory, every social 
communications system operates on the basis of specific distinctions and pro-
cesses meaning in a particular way, thereby developing its peculiar social identi-
ty. As far as these systems of meaning production engage with legal institutions, 
there is a universe of different normative worlds—a situation of “radical legal 
pluralism,” so to speak. Constructivist approaches that take notice of the epis-
temic involvements of normative orders therefore seem especially appropriate 
to analyze law on the basis of a genuine normative pluralism, as they do not 
need to assume some kind of (state-imposed) unity. 
A reconstruction of contract in terms of a constructivist theory of observa-
tion starts with the idea that contract refers to different sources of normative 
meaning. Contract directs the relations of participating actors. Any temporary 
relation between actors can be described as a specific form of a social communi-
cations system, an “interaction system.” This interaction system may be free 
from any legal reference—such as in, for instance, a relation of friendship. Un-
der certain circumstances, however, the law connects legal obligations to this re-
lation even if the actors have not yet concluded a contract—such as, for in-
stance, a duty to negotiate with care.10 Once the actors have concluded a 
contract, the law protects this emergent social interaction system through vari-
ous instruments such as, for instance, the principle of favor contractus.11 Con-
tracts then can be said to “stabilize a specific difference over time while being 
indifferent to everything else, including the consequences of the contract on in-
dividuals and businesses not party to it.”12 
 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  See id. at 7–8. 
 8.  Id. at 10–11. 
 9.  Cover himself suggests such further development in the line of constructivist thinking since he 
explicitly draws on this sociological approach. See id. at 4 n.2. 
 10.  For a survey of European legal systems with regard to legal obligations in pre-contractual deal-
ings (with special emphasis on the differences between English law and the continental legal systems), 
see Sjef van Erp, The Pre-contractual Stage, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 493 (Arthur S. 
Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011). 
 11.  For a discussion of this legal instrument for protection of the emergent relationship, see Ber-
tram Keller, Favor Contractus: Reading the CISG in Favor of the Contract, in SHARING 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT 
H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 247 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. 
Schroeter eds., 2008). See also MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACT LAW 102 (3d ed. 2005). 
 12.  NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 396 (Klaus Ziegert trans., 2004). 
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Contracts channel the observations of the emergent interaction system in a 
peculiar way. Interaction can now be expected to occur in the way set forth in 
the contract. A contract enables the participating actors (known as action sys-
tems) to observe the observations of each other.13 The function of a contract 
consists of the creation of a new environmental reference for the actors in-
volved. Therefore, at least two perspectives need to be distinguished. From the 
perspective of the interaction system, actors are regarded as “parties” and form 
part of the interaction system’s environment. From the perspective of the ac-
tors, it is in turn the contract that becomes an important part of their social en-
vironment, as it provides the environmental conditions for the autonomy of ac-
tors. 
The change of perspective for legal analysis implied in this genuine societal 
approach—starting from social relations instead of individuals—is essential.14 
The new reference is the social relation as such.15 To be sure, under a legal order 
subscribing to the principle of private autonomy, the structure of the interaction 
system is, in the first instance, fixed by the normative claims of the parties. 
However, the “will” of each actor is put into perspective; it is just one of multi-
ple possible references to the environment of the contract. Bilaterally agreed 
rights and duties may be supplemented and may sometimes even be derogated 
from the publicly authorized rules as set out in the private law of states. The 
 
 13.  A less demanding form of coordinating the observations of autonomous systems is the social 
institution of the market. The market enables systems to observe the observations of other systems. It is 
a way for the economic system to make itself partially visible: a totality of operations in a definite mo-
ment of time that can be observed independently by participating economic actors. The economic sys-
tem itself is a system of transactions (and not of reasons). 
 14.  Besides systems theory, the approach of relational sociology explicitly changes the starting 
point for analysis from the individual to social relations. It contends that the units involved in interac-
tion derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the functional roles they play in that interac-
tion. See Mustafa Emirbayer, Manifesto for a Relational Sociology, 103 AM. J. SOC. 281, 287 (1997). For 
a comprehensive exposition on this topic, see generally, PIERPAOLO DONATI, RELATIONAL 
SOCIOLOGY (2012). 
 15.  For a relational approach in legal theory, see Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for 
Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J. 1860, 1884 (1987) (rights can be understood as “the articulation of legal 
consequences for particular patterns of human and institutional relationships”); Jennifer Nedelsky, Re-
conceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 14 (1993) (conceptualizing rights in terms of 
relationships they structure). The context of these relational approaches is the feminist and communi-
tarian critique leveled against a conception of autonomy as self-sufficient independence. Against this 
liberal conception, relational approaches stress that autonomy is a process of parts that mutually specify 
themselves. See id. at 8 (“What makes autonomy possible is not separation, but relationship.”). See 
generally Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 
(1983). For application in the field of property law, see JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE 
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 134 (2000) (property rights as legal rules that shape relationships regarding 
control of valuable resources). In the field of contract law, relational contract theory asks us to consider 
that contracts are not discrete but need to be analyzed in the context of complex exchange relations. 
See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 10 (1980). It correctly assumes that contracts are 
embedded within broader normative contexts. As the focus of this approach is on the relation between 
individuals, it leaves open the issue of the normative structure of the social context for further explora-
tion. See also Dori Kimel, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on the Relational 
Model, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 236 (2007) (criticizing the watering-down of the understand-
ing of relationship in relational contract theory).  
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meaning of the contract as observed by the parties may differ from the meaning 
the legal system gives to the contract. In this way, the same contract is part of 
different normative worlds. 
B.  Modes of Legal Reflexivity 
Contracts are not just afforded meaning in the context of the interaction of 
parties. At the same time, they constitute operations of the legal system. In fact, 
this simultaneity of system relevance is constitutive for the social function of 
contracts. It provides the social system of interaction the complexity of the law 
as a highly differentiated calculus of justice determinations. Yet this complexity 
is largely built by way of a simplified form of self-observation of the legal sys-
tem. In the mode of doctrinal argumentation, the legal system observes itself as 
a fabric of texts referencing each other to preserve a consistent order of deci-
sions; doctrine provides the law with redundancy and allows for novelty only as 
“differences added in small numbers to the stream of reassurances.”16 The text 
of the contract—and the normative claims it puts forward—is subject to the ar-
guments stored in other texts of the legal system, the function of which is lim-
ited to representing the system within the system.17 This kind of doctrinal argu-
mentation does not amount to reflexivity in a way that would allow for the 
rational control of an autonomous legal system. This would instead require the 
legal system to observe itself as a system within an environment by specifically 
reflecting on the unity of the difference between system and environment. If 
translated from constructivist observer theory into the language of causality, 
this means that “a system must control its effects on the environment by check-
ing their repercussions upon itself.”18 The system would have to be able to ex-
pose its own distinctions to reality, to test them, and to thereby observe how the 
system and the environment would change if the distinctions were changed. In 
order to actually operate in this way, legal reasoning has to be supplemented 
with models that account for the social (in other words, environmental) effects 
of rights. An approach that binds itself to the limitations of cognitive idealism 
and the rationality of the “subject,” such as liberal theory, cannot grasp the po-
tential for rationality at the level of social systems. 
When legal analysis is thus prompted to develop models of law’s social ef-
fects, it must do so in all dimensions that are relevant. The will of the parties 
and the interaction system structured by a contract already indicate a plurality 
of references to be elucidated. In fact, the same legal structure can be of rele-
vance in different social systems simultaneously. For instance, as most contracts 
structure economic deals, legal analysis must take into consideration that itera-
 
 16.  Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 131–32 (1972). 
 17.  See Niklas Luhmann, Legal Argumentation: An Analysis of its Form, 58 MOD. L. REV. 285, 287 
(1995). 
 18.  For this restatement of rationality when cognition theory switches from the distinction be-
tween subject and object to the distinction between operation and observation, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS 474–75 (Timothy Lenoir & Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht eds., John Bednarz Jr. trans., 
Stanford Univ. Press 1995). 
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tions of autonomous transactions based on freedom of contract entail competi-
tion in the economic system. Because the emerging social order of competitive 
markets, in turn, constitutes the actual conditions for autonomous contracting 
(and therefore is another important environmental reference of the contract) 
the effect of private rights on these orders constitutes a normative problem. On-
ly when legal reasoning recognizes the normative relevance of the individual 
contract for the economic order and the normative relevance of the economic 
order for the individual contract, the law soars up to a comprehensive reflexivi-
ty that is essential for law’s social responsibility. 
Among legal theories that do account for the social effect of rights, econom-
ic analysis of law is perhaps the most influential. It basically claims that law is 
best understood as a tool to promote economic efficiency as modeled by Pareto 
superiority and mitigated by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.19 However, the main 
problem with this approach is that it leverages the analytics of rational choice 
from the level of the individual economic action to the level of social processes 
at which the decisions of many individuals influence each other. On the basis of 
methodological individualism, the social effects of action cannot be considered 
adequately. That would only be adequate if the “data” on which individual ac-
tors base their plans were generally known objective facts and if this “data” was 
as accessible to a scientific observer (the economist) as the circumstances of the 
observed actors.20 
In economic systems based on individual liberties, however, all the actors 
and second-order observers (including governments, legislators, and courts) are 
equally ignorant as to the effects of their decisions. The assumption of equilib-
rium theory, that actors have perfect knowledge of market conditions, elimi-
nates the key question of how the social use of knowledge is possible when this 
knowledge is fragmentary and distributed among individual actors. “It is rather 
a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the mem-
bers of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals 
know.”21 The social institution that enables individuals to use more knowledge 
than they individually have is the process of competition. Competition makes it 
possible to discover facts that may provide for the efficient use of resources.22 If 
the most efficient allocation of resources were known in advance, “there would 
 
 19.  For a brief account of these concepts, see JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE 
LAW 97–98 (1998). 
 20.  Manfred E. Streit, Cognition, Competition, and Catallaxy, 4 CONST. POLIT. ECON. 223, 235 
(1993). 
 21.  Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 
(1945) (“it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality”). 
 22.  The price of the good communicates the relevant information for adjusting economic plans in 
reaction to the discovery of new facts concerning the use of a resource. The price transmits coded in-
formation about the scarcity of a resource society-wide and makes visible how others observe the mar-
ket. It is significant of the misunderstanding of neoclassical theory to define the coded information of 
prices in a way that makes it possible to decode them with regard to explanatory, objective facts. This 
fails to recognize that actors only evaluate the coded signal from the perspective of their own circum-
stances and respond to it by market transactions. Cf. Streit, supra note 20, at 236 n.10. 
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be no need to rely on at times wasteful and erratic markets and competition.”23 
Or, in the words of Hayek, “if we do not know the facts we hope to discover by 
means of competition, we can never ascertain how effective it has been in dis-
covering those facts that might be discovered.”24 Thus, efficiency beyond the in-
dividual logic of choice becomes an irrelevant concept, whereas at the micro 
level rational choice is contingent upon the information provided by competi-
tion.25 
By predicating a knowledge given in its totality, efficiency theory lacks an 
understanding of the epistemological function of competition and its legal re-
quirements. To evaluate individual transactions in terms of wealth maximiza-
tion, as well as some predetermined optimum, would ultimately mean to test a 
particular contract against a future state of the economic system that is as of yet 
unknown; the process would thus be confounded by its possible result. Legal 
analysis then pretends to anticipate the outcome of operations of another self-
referential system despite the fact that they are not accessible before actual per-
formance for the economic system, much less for the external observer.26 In do-
ing so, economic analysis misses the grammar of the social institution involved 
and thus the legal rules that are necessary to protect the environmental condi-
tions for the operation of the economic system. 
Two aspects then seem especially problematic. First, economic analysis of 
law does not analyze the epistemic institutions of the economic system ade-
quately and therefore fails to develop an adequate model of economic rationali-
ty that could be considered in legal theory. Secondly, economic analysis of law 
just imports the (questionable) criteria for economic rationality into legal rea-
soning; because there is then no place for a specific legal rationality, economic 
analysis does not provide a method to accommodate its normative implications 
with non-economic legal purposes.27 A rational model of law vis-à-vis the eco-
nomic system would instead have to recognize that law impacts the possibilities 
of the economic system to generate knowledge that, in turn, informs decentral-
ized autonomous transactions and thus ultimately influences the adaptability of 
the entire system. It would also have to work out how the law resolves conflicts 
between different social rationalities involved in a case. 
Other than economic analysis, ordoliberal legal theory is aware of the con-
stitutional dimension of private law for the economic system. As such, it pro-
vides a legal model of the interdependencies between law and the economy, 
conceiving of “the economic system as a system of liberty based on a legal order 
 
 23.  ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW 34 (2007). 
 24.  Friedrich August von Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179, 180 (1978).  
 25.  See Streit, supra note 20, at 236; MESTMÄCKER, supra note 23, at 34. 
 26.  In the words of action theory, an inevitably uncertain chain of causation is inherent in the 
market system because the “data” of the different individuals on which they base their plans are adjust-
ed to the objective facts of their environment, which include the actions of the other people. See 
FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 92–106 (1948). 
 27.  This is the central theme in MESTMÄCKER, supra note 23. See, e.g., id. at 13, 14, 17, 21. 
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that provides for and guarantees the constituent economic liberties as individual 
rights.”28 It comes to understand that private law makes sure that individual 
transactions are related to the common good in and through social institutions. 
By adjudicating rights in accordance with the requirements of social institutions, 
private law accounts for the rationality of decentralized orders, such as the 
market economy.29 However, ordoliberal legal theory fails to fully reflect on the 
social environment of the law as well because it restricts law’s constitutional 
analysis to the economic system. In that respect, it falls short of the level of re-
flexivity that can be achieved with the help of the “impartial spectator” pro-
claimed by Adam Smith, a concept regularly invoked by ordoliberal thought it-
self. This moral device can be viewed as an obligation for those who are called 
upon for normative judgment “to address what is left out.”30 As has been sug-
gested, the concept does lean toward an “open impartiality”—in contrast to the 
somehow “closed impartiality” of social contract tradition, with its confinement 
to the views of the parties to the social contract in a sovereign state—requiring 
that the encounter of public reasoning about justice go beyond boundaries of a 
state or a region.31 The pertinence of other societies’ perspectives to broaden 
parochial investigation of relevant normative principles is surely one dimension 
in which normative reasoning has to be opened up. However, the imperative to 
take on different perspectives on a normative question does not stop at the level 
of individuals. The demands of impartiality carry further and urge us to reflect 
comprehensively on the effects of action in all of its different social dimen-
sions.32 
III 
THE JUSTICE OF RELATIONALITY: ADDING REFERENCE 
Legal reasoning must carefully identify all social references involved in a 
given case. Only when jurisprudence comes to recognize the full range of rela-
tions between rights and social orders does it actually observe the law as a sys-
tem within an environment and enable the system as such to operate rationally. 
Only when the law takes into account all of the environmental references of a 
contract may it achieve a kind of “relational justice” that determines the rela-
tions between different social normativities in a responsible way. Relational jus-
tice takes seriously the independent normative claims of the social systems af-
fected and their relatedness in a shared social environment. This way, the law is 
 
 28.  See MESTMÄCKER, supra note 23, at 22–23 (concluding that “[p]rivate law rules (contract, 
property, torts) are, however, not merely the instruments of self interest. They simultaneously make 
individual liberty compatible with the liberty of others under a general rule.”) (emphasis added). 
 29.  See ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, INTRODUCTION TO BÖHM, WETTBEWERB UND 
MONOPOLKAMPF 9 (2010) (1933). 
 30.  Amartya Sen, Uses and Abuses of Adam Smith, 43 HIST. POLIT. ECON. 257, 267–68 (2011). 
 31.  Id. at 268–69. 
 32.  See id. at 266 (explaining that Smith in no way limited his analysis to the operation of the mar-
ket but extended it to non-market institutions and recognized the need for institutional diversity); see 
also infra Part III.B. 
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able to make explicit the public dimension of legal institutions that consists in 
their multi-systemic relevance or, in other words, their “poly-contexturality.”33 
At the heart of a relational concept of justice resides the suggestion to take 
seriously the multiplicity of social references of legal rights. This requires legal 
analysis to make two moves within its own mode of observation: (1) to recog-
nize the social dimension of individual rights as such; and (2) to extend analysis 
to all social systems involved in the exercise of rights. 
A.  The Social Dimension of Individual Rights 
Acknowledging the social dimension of legal rights is not an end in itself. 
Individual rights are an important means by which the complexity of personal 
consciousness becomes available for social systems and their differentiation. 
Because these emergent social orders in turn determine the actual conditions 
for exercising individual autonomy, the social effects of rights present a norma-
tive problem for the law. 
The underlying reason for this nexus is that rights impact the services that 
human consciousness and social systems provide for one another. In fact, com-
munication and consciousness must be understood as each other’s necessary 
environment. The development and innovative capacity of systems can be ex-
plained only if these are viewed as systems in an environment that in turn is 
constituted by the complexity of other (social and individual consciousness) sys-
tems. The knowledge of a social system depends on the extent to which it can 
co-opt distributed knowledge and observational capacity of individual con-
sciousness for its own purpose and for the creation of system knowledge—what 
may be called the problem of “knowledge sharing.”34 One form in which indi-
vidual capacities can be co-opted for social systems is through the granting of 
individual rights to persons. Property rights, for example, assign to particular 
individuals the authority to select, for specific goods, any use from a non-
prohibited class of uses.35 As selection authority is then moved to the local im-
plicit knowledge of the individual, the result is a “collocation of knowledge and 
 
 33.  Depending on the observing system, any event is perceived differently within the contextures 
of different social systems and is afforded different meaning. The result then is a “polycontextural” 
construction of reality. See Niklas Luhmann, The Paradox of System Differentiation and the Evolution 
of Society, in DIFFERENTIATION THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, 409, 421 (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Paul Colomy eds., 1990) (“Whatever happens hap-
pens doubly or multiply, viz., in a system and in the environment of other systems. Therefore every 
structurally relevant event triggers different causal processes depending on whether the events that are 
connected with it are organized as the reaction of a system to itself or as the reaction of many different 
systems to a change in their environment.”). Luhmann’s premise that every contexture operates on a 
binary logic, whereas a co-existence of contextures or systems could only be grasped with the help of a 
multi-valued logic, is based on Gotthard Günther, Life as Poly-Contexturality, in 2 BEITRÄGE ZUR 
GRUNDLEGUNG EINER OPERATIONSFÄHIGEN DIALEKTIK 273 (Felix Meiner ed., 1979). 
 34.  On the problem of knowledge sharing, see also Dan Wielsch, Occupy the Law: Societal Craft-
ing of Intellectual Property Regimes, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2013).  
 35.  For this definition of property rights, see Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property 
Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816, 818 (1965). 
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decision rights” that optimally activates individual capacities (knowledge, expe-
rience, and skills) in selecting the use of scarce goods.36 
Of course, individuals benefit as well. With the help of individual rights, the 
autonomy of persons is recognized and protected. From the perspective of the 
law, a specific part of its environment is assigned a status that is principally not 
subject to legal reconstruction and further scrutiny. Through freedom of con-
tract, for example, the law provides individuals with the necessary reliability of 
expectations for the pursuit of autonomous plans in their interaction with oth-
ers. 
In both respects, it seems reasonable to suggest that rights constitute part of 
the environmental conditions for autonomous operations of various systems of 
meaning production. Shifting law’s attention to the environmental conditions 
for autonomy implies expanding the traditional understanding of individuals as 
the sole social substratum of rights. Legal analysis must certainly evaluate the 
autonomy of the individual and its normative claims, but it must also reflect on 
the constituent social conditions for this autonomy. 
This approach, which considers the relatedness and interdependence of per-
sonal and social autonomies, has already been applied to some private-law insti-
tutions. Family law has developed a notion of this when it reconceives of people 
simultaneously as individuals and as persons deeply involved in relationships of 
interdependency with varying degrees of intimacy.37 Similarly, intellectual prop-
erty law may profit from being reconstructed on the two-tiered basis of the rela-
tion between communication and consciousness. Creation and allocation of in-
dividual rights in communication artifacts requires communication and 
consciousness to be understood as environments that are mutually dependent 
on each other.38 Contrary to increasing “propertization” of knowledge and con-
trary to interpreting intellectual property law as mono-functionally serving the 
economic rationale, such a relational approach in intellectual property law 
stresses the cumulativity of knowledge as well as the need to share basic 
knowledge resources. It submits that protection of legal rights and the freedom 
of development are co-equal principles. 
B.  The Public Dimension: Explicating Social Multi-Referentiality 
Considering the entirety of social references of legal rights relevant in a giv-
en conflict is not a matter of discretion for legal method. Justice requires the 
law to be impartial. In the light of the prevalent subject-centered notion of legal 
philosophy, impartiality implies that existing “configurations” of rights and du-
ties must be equally justified toward everybody. Drawing on the formula ius su-
um cuique tribuendi, justice is said to require consideration of the rights of all 
 
 36.  Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational 
Structure, 8 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 4, 5 (1995). 
 37.  See Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revision-
ing the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 23 (1996). 
 38.  Cf. Wielsch, supra note 34. 
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persons affected by some action.39 This imperative of omnilateral justification is 
even reinforced—and removed from the authority of legislators and judges—
when it is argued that every autonomous person has a moral “right to justifica-
tion,” that is, a right to be recognized as an agent who can demand acceptable 
reasons for any social structure that claims to be binding upon him or her.40 To 
be sure, this concept of justice is still grounded in the idea that society is made 
up by the coexistence of individuals in freedom. 
However, this focus on the Kantian concept of freedom seems to be too nar-
row because it neglects the importance of social systems for the autonomy of 
individuals. As mentioned, social structures (such as institutions and social sys-
tems) provide the environmental conditions for the autonomy of actors. Corre-
spondingly, in a more comprehensive account of justice, the law would also 
have to care for the coexistence of social systems. If law begins to care not just 
for the adjudication of rights, but also for the conditions required for these 
rights to become effective, then the task is two-tiered. First, the rights claimed 
by the parties must be linked to the social autonomies they presuppose. Second, 
the law must consider the relations between these social systems and take into 
account that they mutually form environments for each other. In this respect, 
law subscribes to a kind of “societal constitutionalism” that is concerned with 
constituting the autonomy of social systems as well as protecting the integrity of 
the environment from the system’s autonomy.41 It recognizes that the preserva-
tion of certain environmental conditions is essential for the operations of the 
system.42 A relational legal analysis would also have to consider such “systemic 
reciprocities.” This does not mean to discard law’s reference to individual au-
tonomy.43 Rather, the idea is to add perspective to let the law know where the 
true seat of social coercion is to be found. The main concern is then to guide the 
law in the mission of impartial justification. 
1. Social Normativity 
This way of legal reasoning builds on the idea that social institutions and 
systems imply a normativity of their own. For legal and moral theories that buy 
 
 39.  See Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41, 60 (Jeremy Waldron 
ed., 1984) (“[A]n action is just if, and only if, it is prescribed exclusively by regard for the rights of all 
whom it affects substantially.”).  
 40.  On the basic moral right to justification, see Rainer Forst, The Justification of Human Rights 
and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach, 120 ETHICS 711, 719 (2010). 
 41.  See GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS 75 (2012); Riccardo Prandini, The 
Morphogenesis of Constitutionalism, in The TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 309, 326 (Petra Dob-
ner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010). 
 42.  The interdependency of systems is rooted in a reciprocal relation between the systems. For 
instance, it results from the demands that competition as an economic principle puts on the law (for ex-
ample, to provide with individual rights), and from the demands that the law makes for implementing 
the principle of competition (such as to prohibit restraint of competition). 
 43.  Proponents of a relational account of rights also regard the new perspective as additive. See 
SINGER, supra note 15, at 135 (noting that focusing on rights as relationships requires judging the inter-
ests of the parties, but it also involves understanding and shaping social relations by adopting rules of 
law that either mirror or promote viable and defensible social relationships). 
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into constructivist rationalism and thus assume that normativity is based on con-
tract or agreement, this implication may seem dubious. Yet alternative accounts 
of law and society indeed conceive of legal rules as being based on societal con-
ventions. Hume, for instance, argues that legal rules, just as moral beliefs, con-
stitute neither innate ideas nor conclusions of reason but an outcome of practi-
cal experience, of artifacts, and of standards.44 Outside of the social contract 
model, rules may not be reduced to the execution of an already existing social 
order construed by the individual. Rather, they are the expression of the evolu-
tion of conventions and social order. The main idea of Hume’s critique of the 
social contract is that “the essence of society is not the law but rather the insti-
tution.”45 In this sense, social normativity precedes the law. Characteristic of 
such an institutional account of law is the location of creative force in society.46 
This regulatory force is grounded in the fact that institutions (markets, corpora-
tions, networks, et cetera) decide on the extent of collectively generated 
knowledge (such as the richness of content) and the way it is used (through cen-
tralized or decentralized decisions). Institutions embody rules of knowledge 
sharing and are therefore of great relevance for the evolution of social systems 
that, in turn, affect individual autonomy.47 
The type of knowledge to be shared through institutions is, however, gener-
ated according to the distinctions processed by social systems. As systems theo-
ry made clear, the main driving forces of social differentiation are social func-
tion systems that exclusively dispose of specific communicative media (such as 
power, money, and law) with society-wide impact. These systems are monopo-
lies for the creation of political, economic, scientific, and religious meaning. The 
autonomy of their specific medium and the integrity of the specific discourse 
translate into normative claims of their own. These claims may be secured in-
ternally through a kind of internal morality.48 Yet it has been worked out that 
the autonomy of systems is even secured in the form of sectoral constitutions 
 
 44.  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 496 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896) 
(“[T]hose impressions, which give rise to this sense of justice are not natural to the mind of man, but 
arise from artifice and human conventions.”). 
 45.  See GILLES DELEUZE, EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY 45 (1991); HUME, supra note 44, at 
501 (describing the “establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, be not only useful 
but even absolutely necessary to human society”). 
 46.  See MAURICE HAURIOU, AU SOURCES DU DROIT: LE POUVOIR, L’ORDRE ET LA LIBERTE 
94 (1933) (“[I]l s’agit de savoir, où se trouve, dans la société, le pouvoir créateur; si ce sont les règles de 
droit qui créent les institutions ou si ce ne sont pas les institutions qui engendrent les règles de droit, 
grâce au pouvoir de gouvernement qu’elles contiennent.”). 
 47.  If the law must be assumed to process a model of normativity that is dependent on the cooper-
ation of a whole network of cognitive and practical conventions and patterns of behavior, the conse-
quence is a kind of epistemological turn in legal analysis: the social function of rights is then to be seen 
in the generation of generalizable experience as a positive externality to individual decision making. See 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Postmodern Condition of Law and Societal “Management of Rules,” 27 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 87, 92 (2006). In turn, the legitimacy of rights consists in the 
possibility for the individual to derive personal advantage of experience stored in iterations of artificial-
ly constituted relations. Id. 
 48.  A well-known example is the analysis of the mores of science by Robert K. Merton, The Nor-
mative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 270 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1979) (1942). 
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that make use of “constitutive rules” to regulate the abstractions of communica-
tive media within globally constituted function systems.49 The law recognizes 
these different systemic normativities in various ways. In constitutional law, for 
instance, the general principle of equality is held not to be violated if a differen-
tial treatment of persons or situations is based on objective reasons that vary 
according to subject matter. This way, the legal system construes the criteria for 
treating like cases alike in accordance with the different social spheres or, in 
terms of the present theoretical approach, in accordance with the different so-
cial function systems. Constitutional justification thus distinguishes between dif-
ferent “spheres of justice.”50 
2. Impartiality Unleashed: Multiplication of Perspective 
A social conflict may be caused by the collision of normative imperatives 
arising from different social autonomies, each of which may require a different 
course of action in the situation given. Provided the autonomies involved are 
protected through rights, the conflict can be treated as a legal dispute. Legal 
analysis must then elucidate all the relevant social references of rights and must 
consider the different sources of normative meaning on principally equal foot-
ing. This extension of the scope of legal analysis to different social normativities 
is supported by an account of impartiality provided by the moral and legal theo-
ry of Adam Smith. 
Essentially, Smith’s concept of the “impartial spectator” can be interpreted 
as a model that requests observers to perform a change of perspective in order 
to ensure the appropriateness of moral decisions.51 Although Smith places hu-
man nature in the center of his moral theory and is focused on the relations be-
tween individuals, he nonetheless makes two significant moves that may serve 
 
 49.  See TEUBNER, supra note 41, at 75–76 (using Searle’s distinction between constitutive and 
regulative norms for a theory of sector-specific constitutions in society). See also John R. Searle, Social 
Ontology: Some Basic Principles, 6 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 12 (2006). 
 50.  See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). Walzer calls for a theory of “complex 
equality” since social conventions would assign different kinds of resources and opportunities to differ-
ent “spheres,” each of which is governed by its own distinct principles of justice. “In any differentiated 
society, justice will make for harmony only if it first makes for separation.” Id. at 319. This pluralistic 
theory of justice, of course, falls victim to criticism by those who purport a unitary account according to 
which all the different values involved must be made to fit together consistently to justify a decision 
with distributive effects. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, To Each His Own, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
214–20 (1986). In contrast, a sociological jurisprudence shares Walzer’s focus on the differentiated 
spheres that construct the social meaning of goods and distributive criteria, but would, on the one side, 
call for a generalization of the idea that different social contexts produce different principles of justice 
beyond the question of distribution, and, on the other hand, offers itself a much elaborated explanation 
of how meaning is produced in society. See Gunther Teubner, Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or 
Transcendence Formula of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2009). 
 51.  See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie 
eds., 1976) (Moral criticism prompts us “to examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how 
these must appear to [other people], by considering how they would appear to us if in their situation. 
We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it 
would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, 
with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.”). See also id. at 262–64. 
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as the starting point for further abstractions. In contrast to Hume, he conceives 
of sympathy, the central mechanism to relate with others, as being triggered not 
by the character of the agents involved but rather by the particular situation and 
the entire context. Moral judgment is, in his view, not concerned with character 
as such, but with character on the basis of its expression in action; it is a judg-
ment in terms of concrete situational propriety of conduct.52 Moreover, and 
most importantly, the impartial spectator is not to be thought of as a concrete 
person. In fact, the figure of the impartial spectator is rather a model of obser-
vation. As such, the function of the impartial spectator can be performed by any 
meaning-processing entity capable of observations. It requires observation to 
engage in a change of perspective and to look at the situation from any other 
point of view.53 To observe a situation in “candid and impartial light” does not 
mean to adopt an observation-independent point of view, nor does it mean to 
figure out the interest of society as if it were the interest of a single person.54 In-
stead, it ultimately means that judgment has to take on all perspectives in-
volved. 
Relational legal analysis takes up this notion of impartiality originating from 
the multiplication of perspective. Keeping in mind that the law is called upon to 
decide the conflicts between different claims of autonomy, this multi-
perspectivity constitutes the internal morality of the law itself: to add reference 
and to decide the conflict with due regard to all sources of normative meaning. 
The idea of impartiality predicated here is best characterized in an applica-
tive sense as distinguished from the usual universal-reciprocal understanding.55 
Impartiality, in the applicative sense, calls for the complete and appropriate 
consideration of all the features of a situation in which a norm is to be applied.56 
 
 52.  See KNUD HAAKONSSON, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR 69–70 (1981). 
 53.  Smith develops the impartiality of judgment by deliberately widening the set of sympathetic 
spectators until the position of a spectator is resolved into “every indifferent by-stander” and “every 
impartial spectator.” See SMITH, supra note 51, at 22–23, 69. Smith argues that “[w]e must view [oppo-
site interests], neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, 
but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and 
who judges with impartiality between us.” See id., at 135. 
 54.  This is the misunderstanding in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1973). See 
MESTMÄCKER, supra note 23, at 23. 
 55.  On this distinction, see KLAUS GÜNTHER, THE SENSE OF APPROPRIATENESS 37–38 (Kenneth 
Baynes ed., John Farrell trans., State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1993) (1957). As Günther argues, what is rel-
evant to justification is only the norm itself and the question of whether it is in the interest of all that 
everyone follows the rule. In addition, we “need yet another principle which obligates us to examine in 
every individual situation whether the requirement of the rule, namely, that it be followed in every situ-
ation to which it is applicable, is legitimate too.” Id. at 37. So, in the end, impartiality of (moral and le-
gal) judgment must be understood as a process in which we have yet to form the appropriate norm. Id. 
at 38. 
 56.  Id. at 111. For Smith, the sense of appropriateness is part of the model of the impartial specta-
tor because “that there may be some correspondence of sentiments between the spectator and the per-
son principally concerned, the spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much as he can, to put himself 
in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance . . . . He must . . .  
strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation.” See SMITH, supra note 51, at 
21. Since Smith’s model of moral judgment does not aim at universalization but rather at de-
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Since features of a situation are not per se relevant, but first acquire this status 
in the light of interpretations through which various normativities claim validi-
ty—different normative worlds arrive at different interpretations of the same 
situation—the requirement of impartiality in the applicative sense means that 
these different interpretations of a situation must be addressed. The complete 
description of the situation is subjected to a kind of “normative exhaustion,” 
which puts forward all sources of normative meaning. 
Jurisprudence can acknowledge this in various ways and has done so in the 
past. For instance, German interest jurisprudence (“Interessenjurisprudenz”)— 
and similar American legal realism—directed the study of law to focus on the 
social objectives it is intended to achieve and it reconstructed the quaestio iuris 
as a conflict of interests.57 “Interest” in this context must be understood as a le-
gal concept, just as rights are. Law can thus switch on its own programs and me-
diate interests through rights, showing a way out of the irresolvable clash be-
tween different interests as such. Yet, the crucial move is that law treats 
interests as exogenous to the law, as pertaining to politics proper, for example. 
Through the reference to interests, the legal system refers to the environment; it 
does not ordain interests but is guided by what the parties themselves formulate 
as their interests.58 If legal argumentation thereby combines self-reference and 
hetero-reference, it opens up law for learning vis-à-vis the environment because 
law can now control its decisions by its own picture of the political environ-
ment—by the legal reenactment of politics as it were.59 Since the driving force of 
social evolution are not singular interests but interests as shaped by the ration-
alities of socials systems, legal analysis must include references to system auton-
omies in its internal pictures of the environment. Legal analysis would have to 
become aware that one of the major problems in today’s society exists in the re-
lations between social systems. Conflict is inevitable where systems lack stop 
rules for the excessive growth of their particular sub-rationality—for example, 
the maximization of the society-wide impact of their communicative media—
that collides with other sub-rationalities or even with the system’s self-
reproduction.60 Therefore, a kind of “societal constitutionalism” is needed that 
urges function systems to develop internal (self-) limitations in analogy to the 
political system (separation of powers, rule of law, and fundamental rights). In 
the context of such a constitutionalization of social systems—a process that usu-
 
relativization—at changing of perspectives and transcending partiality—he has no difficulty in integrat-
ing this applicative dimension from the outset.  
 57.  For a comparative view on American legal realism and German interest jurisprudence, see 
Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law 
and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008). 
 58.  See Luhmann, supra note 17, at 297. 
 59.  For a short account of how law perceives its environment in the light of interest jurisprudence, 
see EMILIOS CHRISTODOULIDIS, LAW AND REFLEXIVE POLITICS 156–57 (2001). 
 60.  Growth gets pathologic and turns into destruction if it collides with other social dynamics. 
Teubner, supra note 41, at 81. Teubner identifies, in addition to the two mentioned types of collisions, a 
third one: the collision with a comprehensive rationality of world society (by assuming that the subsys-
tems, from their decentralized perspective, were able to reflect on a macro-rationality). See id. 
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ally needs a lot of social energy—law plays a crucial role, because it makes 
normatively binding a special type of reflexivity that is essential for the strategy 
of the decentralized mastery of differentiation, namely the observation of itself 
as a system within an environment. The legal instrument by which this kind of 
reflexivity is enforced is the development of “ecological integrity rules,” which 
are rules that protect the integrity of system-specific knowledge sharing pro-
cesses from being subjected to the expansive rationality of other systems.61 
Whereas social systems other than the law may or may not wind up to qualified 
rationality in the sense that they reflect on their environmental effects by them-
selves, the very idea of the law is to add on perspective and to observe the mul-
tiplicity of relations between systems and their environments.62 Law acquires its 
own rationality—its justice—only by engaging with the rationality of other sys-
tems. The decisions of law are being specialized in bringing in those construc-
tions of meaning, those autonomies, and those conditions of autonomy that 
have been neglected in the course of a conflict. This way, law is able to develop 
rules that make autonomous claims compatible with each other. 
IV 
THE REFERENCES OF CONTRACT 
A.  Freedom of Contract: Normative Relating of Autonomy 
Contracts structure interaction systems that, in turn, constitute a common 
social reference for participating actors. As previously mentioned, the result is 
the stabilization of a specific normativity that is indifferent to everything else in 
the social environment, including the consequences of the contract on individu-
als and businesses not party to it.63 
The basic idea of private law is that society can afford these instances of idi-
osyncratic observation because it is only indirectly that actions of individuals 
are related to the common good. Individuals are free to pursue personal prefer-
ences and interests within the rules of private law. These rules do not directly 
impose constraints on the parties by replacing the normative program of the 
contract, as drafted by the parties, with public norms, because this would 
amount to discarding the cooption of individual observation capacity for social 
purpose. Historically, the guiding principle of private autonomy, rather, is the 
idea of achieving order through social institutions; as long as the contract in 
question is concluded by the parties being informed with the help of competi-
tive markets, the law usually does not interfere with the normative program 
agreed upon by the parties. In principle, the only prerequisite for acknowledg-
 
 61.  For example, by acknowledging the enforceability of open licensing models the law protects 
knowledge-sharing in arts and science from being enslaved by the expansive logic of the economy. See 
Wielsch, supra note 34. 
 62.  In most cases there will only be two social systems involved: one that is overly expansive rela-
tive to another one whose integrity of knowledge-sharing is at risk. 
 63.  See infra Part II.A.  
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ing this individually crafted normative program is the procedural integrity of the 
discourse that sets up the terms. Contractual discourse must provide for the 
chance to introduce the perspectives of both participating actors. Essentially, 
contracting is about the creation of an emergent social system that is fueled by a 
diversity of perspectives.64 
B.  Standard Contracts and Private Law: Reintroducing Social Reference 
In contrast, the standardization of contract terms re-formalizes the contract 
and makes it less specific to a particular social relation. If one party introduces 
boilerplate provisions, the counterparty can be said to submit itself to a “ready-
made legal order.”65 The case for tolerating indifference of standards becomes 
more complicated. The assumption that the normativity of a given contract pays 
due regard to the autonomies of both participating actors is no longer valid. The 
specific difference, which the contract establishes, is structured by one of the 
parties alone so that the consequent indifference may extend not just to third 
persons but also to the counterparty itself. Though, of course, the contract re-
mains a social system of interaction between two actors, its legal program is set 
unilaterally with the input just from the perspective of one party. The environ-
mental reference of the contract may therefore be biased in favor of the auton-
omy of one party. As the procedural rationality of contracting—which provides 
for consideration of different perspectives—could not become effective, con-
tract loses its character as an instrument for relating different normative claims. 
The presumption of relational justice inherent in contracts is suspended.66 
From the point of view of relational legal analysis, private law, therefore, 
has reason to reintroduce the missing perspective into the contractual relation. 
Indeed, some national legal orders have enacted particular regulations regard-
ing standard form contracts and subject them to a fairness test.67 As it appears, 
the most stringent way for private law to conceive of this public instrument of 
control is to distinguish between standard contract terms, on the one hand, and 
contract, on the other hand, as two distinct categories that respond to different 
problems of social ordering. The latter aims at a consensual legal framework for 
a customized deal and the former imposes a preconditioned normative scheme 
for mass distribution of uniform products. In fact, standardized contracts can be 
regarded as a form of private regulation that must meet certain criteria of justi-
fication in order to be recognized as enforceable.68 In the absence of a pre-
 
 64.  At the same time the perspectives involved limit the normative imperative of the contract. This 
is reflected in the doctrine of privity of contract. 
 65.  As famously phrased by the German Reichsgericht in DEUTSCHES RECHT 1210, 1211 (1941). 
 66.  Traditional doctrine, instead, is focused on the commutative justice of contract that is con-
cerned with the relative equivalence of the benefits exchanged. 
 67.  On differing assessments of the need for regulating standard-form contracts and the resulting 
different models in approaching the issue, see Thomas Wilhelmsson, Various Approaches to Unfair 
Terms and Their Background Philosophies, 14 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 51 (2008). 
 68.  See Dan Wielsch, Global Law’s Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 
1075, 1078–80 (2012). 
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contractual bargaining discourse, which could be reflective of different sources 
of legal meaning concerning contractual rights, the fairness test emulates the 
missing discourse as if it had happened: the counterparty is only subject to the 
standard terms if they stipulate rights and duties that would—at a minimum—
result from actual discourse. A fairness test for standard contract terms thus op-
erates as a public rule of recognition for a special type of private regulation that 
is prone to neglecting environmental reference. 
Another instrument by which the law can make sure that social references 
of a contract are considered comprehensively are general clauses such as bona 
fide or good faith.69 Historically, the function of good faith had been to make 
sure that any contract—including the ones individually negotiated—was in ac-
cordance with social morality.70 However, under contemporary conditions of so-
cietal fragmentation into specialized discourses, recourse to morality must be 
replaced by recourse to the idées directrices of the institutions affected by con-
tractual rights and the substantive demands of social systems. Unbounded prior-
ity of the individual consensus between parties to the contract cannot be insist-
ed upon, whether one is dealing with matters of individual conscience, strict 
religious prohibitions, political freedoms, regulatory policies, or economic insti-
tutions.71 As a result, good faith may have to complement contractual duties 
with social expectations produced by those spheres of legal meaning in order to 
provide for compliance of a given contract with the multitude of societal con-
texts it is part of. Because the contractual program is then construed in a way 
that takes account of social references initially missing, bona fide functions as a 
public rule of recognition for private normativity, too. Other general clauses of 
private law may operate in a similar way.72 
C.  Multi-Firm Standardization: Developing Public Rules of Recognition 
A further level of challenge to reflection of the public dimension of contract 
is reached in cases of multi-firm contract standardization. This form of contrac-
tual regulation is likely to develop where state law is nonexistent, inflexible, or 
parochial. Private initiatives of standardization are closely coupled with the 
network of cognitive and practical conventions in different sectors of business 
and can therefore be highly responsive to the respective rationalities of interac-
tion. Moreover, private standards can easily cross borders and become transna-
tional because they only require freedom of contract to be promulgated. Espe-
 
 69.  On good faith in U.S. law, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17 (4th ed. 2004). 
 70.  See FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 377–78 (Tony Weir trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1995). 
 71.  See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 23 (1998). 
 72.  In common law that operates without general clauses, other sorts of legal norms have features 
that are characteristic of general clauses. See Simon Whittaker, Theory and Practice of the ‘General 
Clause’ In English Law: General Norms and the Structuring of Judicial Discretion, in GENERAL 
CLAUSES AND STANDARDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 57 (Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud 
eds., 2006). 
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cially under conditions of globalization, where legal relations have a variety of 
non-territorial affiliations—such that the imposition of community norms on a 
dispute with links to other communities would become presumptuous—and 
where private actors may even be in the position to evade national regulation—
such that sovereignty would become simply ineffective—it can be in the interest 
of the state itself that transnational private regulation gains traction.73 
At the same time, multi-firm standard contract terms limit the discovery 
function of competitive markets in offering a variety of contractual regimes 
because they foreclose the possibility of modeling customized rules. Since the 
very idea of standardization consists of providing a uniform model for 
transactions in a certain market, it exerts a strong market regulatory function.74 
Even if the agreed upon terms of the contract are fair and reasonable in 
themselves, they may be undesirable because the standardization eliminates 
competition among reasonable terms.75 Multi-firm standardization is thus able 
to determine the normativity of contract in whole sectors of economic 
transaction.76 If markets are ruled out as external forces that put pressure on 
contractual normativity to be reflective of environmental concerns, there must 
be other mechanisms in place to make sure that the resulting private normative 
orders take into account a diversity of social references. Whether these private 
regimes provide for justificatory elements in this sense is checked by criteria set 
forth in public rules of recognition.77 
As case studies of private regulatory regimes based on standard contract 
terms show, these criteria vary with the extension of the normative claim of the 
private rules, and they are particularly high if the regime affects third parties. 
Specifically, they require that affected interests are represented in the process 
of setting up the regime: that the sector-specific regime performs a public 
 
 73.  In a globalized world, states may find it useful to “consider a broader set of governmental in-
terests in being part of an interlocking world system of transnational regulation and multiple communi-
ty affiliation.”  Paul S. Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Gov-
ernmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1852 (2005) (discussing an adequate vision 
of conflict of laws in a global world).  
 74.  See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 56 (1999). 
 75.  See Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV 
327, 334 (2010).  
 76.  The question is also whether courts are prepared to deal with complex global standards such as 
in the financial industry. Given the decentralized way of adjudicating cases before national courts, 
which does not allow for development of a settled body of law, and given that the market may have 
greater interest in the outcome of a case than the litigating parties do, the concern is that a wrong deci-
sion from a court can give rise to systemic consequences. This suggests not only searching for ways to 
inform courts with expert knowledge about the rationality of financial markets, but also establishing 
specialized dispute settlement in the global financial markets. See Jeffrey B. Golden, The Courts, the 
Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk, 4 CAP. MARKETS L. J. S141 (2009). 
 77.  Any system of positive law must contain a test of validity or a rule must pass in order to be 
binding in that system. As Hart explained, this test or rule takes on the status of a special secondary 
rule—a rule of recognition. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (Joseph Raz & Penelope 
Bullock eds., 2d ed. 1994). National legal systems have developed a subset of criteria by which they 
check whether a private normative order is rendered binding. For further details, see Wielsch, supra 
note 68, at 1095–1100. 
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function, that they eventually provide for a right to opt out of the regime, and 
that it is in compliance with essential public policy.78 These criteria ensure that 
the private normativity in question is constituted by a plurality of social 
perspectives. Most notably, however, the rules of recognition themselves are 
subject to a process of justification because they may have to be accommodated 
within the augmented normativity originating in the private sphere. Private 
regulatory regimes and national law engage in a form of dialectical interaction.79 
Where the private lawmaking process is open and strives for balanced rules in a 
multitude of relationships, state law cannot just refer to the usual limitations of 
private autonomy and simply dismiss rules with effects beyond the stipulating 
parties. 
V 
RULES OF LAWMAKING 
Developing new modes of justification for contractual normativity is 
necessary, especially under conditions of transnational private ordering in 
which the public dimension of contract cannot be channeled through the state 
and national constitutions. Only in the regulatory context of nation-states, the 
juridification of social spheres must comply with the higher norms of a 
constitution, and only here the impact of specialized legal regimes on the 
individual is moderated by coordination with other legal regimes that protect 
different values and different types of social interaction. 
Still, phenomena of global law indicate that, even absent statist rules of 
recognition, norms of private global regimes can acquire the same binding force 
as state norms. Especially, private arbitral tribunals may also host the rule of 
law and provide the primary norms of a regulatory regime with reflexive 
second-order observation that subjects those norms to binding decisions on 
their legality, thereby producing secondary norms for the regime in question. 
Therefore, public rules of recognition should not be identified with national 
legal orders. To be sure, rules of recognition evolve along sector-specific private 
legal regimes. However, this does not mean the rules of recognition are private, 
too. Irrespective of the forum of recognition, be it national courts or arbitral 
tribunals, privately created normative orders need to comply with some generic 
criteria in order to make their pervasive effects appear legitimate. The focus is 
on the substantial requirements of the “rule of lawmaking.” 
The idea of relational justice submits that such a rule essentially makes 
binding the consideration of all sources of normative meaning affected by the 
normativity to be qualified as law. The “publicness” of a public rule of 
recognition would then consist in the commitment of any regime hosting the 
 
 78.  See Wielsch, supra note 68, at 1081–94. 
 79.  On “dialectical” interaction of legal orders, see also Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 
80 S. CAL. L. REV 1155, 1176, 1199, 1201 (2007) (with a focus limited to formal state and international 
legal institutions, such as the engagement of domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
in a series of interpretive mutual accommodation strategies). 
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rule of law to require multilateral justifiability from the social norms to be rec-
ognized. In particular, relational justice asks legal reasoning to take seriously 
the public dimension of contract as constituted by its polycontextural relevance 
in different spheres of autonomy. This way, legal theory provides law with a 
redefinition of justice under conditions of normative pluralism. 
 
